In 1992-1993, the SEC required enhanced disclosure on executive compensation and Congress enacted tax legislation, i.e. Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m), limiting the deductibility of non-performance related compensation over one million dollars. We examine the effects of these regulatory changes and report small and large sample evidence that many million-dollar firms have reduced salaries in response to 162(m) and that salary growth rates have declined post-1993 for the firms most likely to be affected by the regulations. We further document that bonus and total compensation payouts are increasingly sensitive to stock returns after 1993, especially for firms with million-dollar pay packages. We also document that, once we control for factors affecting CEO incentives, the sensitivity of the CEO's wealth to changes in shareholder wealth has increased from 1993 to 1996 for firms with CEOs approaching the million-dollar mark. Overall, our results suggest that some firms have altered the structure of CEO compensation in response to 162(m) by reducing salaries and that, on average, the pay for performance sensitivity has increased following the regulations, especially for million-dollar firms.
Introduction
CEO compensation has received much public and academic scrutiny. Much of the CEO compensation controversy has focused on rising CEO compensation levels and on the absence of a strong relation between executive compensation and firm performance. As recently as February 25, 1999, Board of Governors' Chairman Alan Greenspan criticized the current executive compensation levels in Capitol Hill testimony on the state of monetary policy. Specifically, Greenspan said "I find a lot of what is being paid to individual CEOs not directed to the value that they are producing for their shareholders, who are paying the bill."
Greenspan's concern is not new. Jensen and Murphy (1990) , for example, analyze and discuss the low pay for performance sensitivity in the 1970s and 1980s. Recent evidence, suggests, however, that the pay for performance sensitivity may be increasing. Hall and Liebman (1998) , for example, document that pay for performance sensitivity has increased since the early 1980s, with a striking acceleration in the l ast three years of their sample (1992) (1993) (1994) . They conclude that in recent years CEOs have not been paid like bureaucrats. One plausible explanation for this change is that the increasing pressure from outside investors on boards of directors has led to increased sensitivity of executive pay to firm performance. [Johnson and Shackell (1997) , Smith (1996) , Strickland, Wiles, and Zenner (1996) , and Wahal (1996) , amongst others, document the rise in shareholder activism in the early 1990s].
This increased public attention on the pay for performance relation resulted in regulatory intervention by the SEC in 1993 requiring enhanced disclosure on executive compensation and the enactment of tax legislation limiting the deductibility of non-performance related compensation over one million dollars [Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code, henceforth Section 162(m) or 162(m)]. The goal of the new SEC disclosure requirements, as stated in the SEC's first release on July 2, 1992, was to make disclosure of compensation paid or awarded to executive officers clearer and more concise, and of greater utility to shareholders. 1 In addition, Congress never intended for Section 162(m) to be a revenue-raising provision, but instead Congress hoped to change corporate behavior. Recently, the amount of compensation received by corporate executives has been the subject of scrutiny and criticism. The committee believes that excessive compensation will be reduced if the deduction for compensation (other than performance-based compensation) paid to the top executives of publicly held corporations is limited to $1 million per year. 3 We examine whether the enhanced disclosure rules and 162(m) have actually changed compensation behavior. 4 First, we identify firms from the ExecuComp database that are likely to be affected by the regulations and especially 162(m), henceforth generically called "million-dollar firms". We define three variables to identify the million-dollar firms. The first variable is equal to one if the CEO's salary is more than one million dollars in the prior year, and is equal to the prior year's salary divided by one million dollars if the prior year's salary is less than one million dollars. Hall and Liebman (1999) use a similar definition. The second variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm's CEO earns a salary that is larger than $900,000 in the prior year, and zero otherwise. We do not want to just capture the firms that are already subject to the 162(m) limitation, but also the firms that are getting close enough to this benchmark to be concerned about loss of deductibility. Third, we define an indic ator variable equal to one for firms with CEOs earning annual cash compensation (including salary and bonus) of more than one 1 Murphy (1995) explains that the SEC's 1992 proxy reform initiative was a response to the public outcry on executive compensation and the Senate bill on shareholder rights and CEO compensation. 2 Megan M. Reilly, "Former Treasury Official Discusses Executive Compensation Cap," 62 Tax Notes 747 (February 3, 1994) . 3 1993 U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News 877. 4 Changing behavior could mean that the changes have led to real economic effects or that the compensation contracts are cosmetically different but that the economic effects are unchanged. Miller and Scholes (1981) examine the influence of personal taxes on compensation contracts. They argue that some compensation plans are clearly taxadvantageous schemes because they defer payments for employees in tax brackets that are higher than the corporation's tax bracket, implying that personal taxes at the very least have a cosmetic effect on the design of compensation contracts. million dollars at least once over the [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] period. This broad definition includes about half of the firms in our sample suggesting that 162(m) is relevant for many firms. Overall, our results are qualitatively similar using the three definitions.
5
To examine the behavior-shaping effects of the regulations we then formulate and test the following propositions: Proposition 1: Compensation levels decrease or at least increase at a declining rate following the regulations.
We find that real compensation levels have increased dramatically.
Although rising stock option grants contribute greatly to these increases, all compensation components have increased and there is no evidence that the rates of compensation increase have declined after 1993.
In fact, controlling for performance, salary growth has increased after 1993. Proposition 2: Salaries close to or above one million dollars increase at a lower rate after 1993 than lower salaries and firms reduce salaries above one million dollars because of 162(m) . Consistent with this proposition, we find that after 1993 the salary growth rate is significantly smaller for firms near or above the million-dollar threshold. We also find that most firms reducing salaries to a level at or below one million dollars do so in response to 162(m). On the other hand, these salary reductions do not lead to lower total compensation.
Proposition 3: Performance sensitive components of compensation, such as bonus and stock-based compensation, have become more important after 1993. We find that performance sensitive components of compensation, especially stock option grants, have become much l arger components of total compensation following 1993. Proposition 4: There is an increase in the sensitivity of bonus payments and total compensation to performance after 1993, especially for firms subject to 162(m) .
For firms that are likely to be affected by 162(m), we find an increase in the sensitivity of bonus payments and total compensation to contemporaneous and lagged stock performance after 1993. This increased 5 To identify "firms subject to shareholder pressures," we also examine separately firms with low CEO equity ownership or firms targeted by shareholder activists, expecting that these firms will be more sensitive to shareholder sensitivity of compensation to stock returns is not due to the mechanical increase in stock option values when the stock market is rising.
In the first part of our paper, we emphasize annual pay, defined as the annual flows of cash compensation and option and restricted stock grants. In the context of the regulations, it is important to analyze this annual flow because; (1) the compensation committee of the board of directors has a direct influence over this annual flow to the CEO; (2) because shareholder activists, the press, regulators, and many previous academic studies have focused on the annual pay of CEOs and not on changes in the value of CEO equity holdings; and (3) the regulations were directly targeting this annual flow, especially cash compensation. We recognize, however, as documented by Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Hall and Liebman (1998) 
162(m).
We follow Hall and Liebman (1998) by examining a variety of measures of company-related CEO wealth changes. Specifically, we examine changes from 1993 to 1996 for (1) the percent change in compensation, defined as the change in the CEO's firm-specific wealth if performance increases from the 50 th percentile of stock returns to the 70 th percentile of returns; (2) the elasticity, defined as the percent change in compensation calculated above divided by the percent change in market value or difference in total shareholder return from the 50 th to the 70 th percentile in that year; and (3) the JensenMurphy statistic defined as the dollar change in CEO wealth for a $1,000 change in firm value. The sensitivity of CEO wealth to company wealth is higher than the one reported by Jensen and Murphy pressures concerning the lack of CEO incentives or the lack of compliance with 162(m). These tests are discussed in (1990) for the 1970s and 1980s. For instance, using the Jensen-Murphy statistic or sharing rate, we document a median CEO sharing rate in 1996 of $7 to about $25 per $1,000 shareholder gain or loss, depending on the subgroups. This is in line with the Hall and Liebman (1998) findings that pay to performance sensitivity in the 1990s is substantially higher than the sensitivity documented by Jensen and
Murphy. More importantly, in a regression framework we find that there is an increase in the wealth-toperformance sensitivity from 1993 to 1996 for firms approaching the million-dollar benchmark, i.e. firms affected by 162(m).
Overall, we find that firms that reduced million-dollar salaries tended to do so in response to 162(m), that after controlling for firm performance, salaries have increased at a lower rate for firms with salaries near or above one million dollars after 1993, and that the sensitivity of pay to stock returns increased after 1993, especially for million-dollar firms. These results suggest that compensation committees have taken 162(m) into account by modifying the structure of compensation contracts. Additional analysis of the changes in firm-specific CEO wealth and compensation suggests that these changes have also had a significant economic impact beyond annual compensation flows determined by the board of directors.
Specifically, we find that the level of CEO incentives, as measured by the sharing rates or the elasticity of CEO wealth to changes in firm wealth, has increased from 1993 to 1996 for million-dollar firms in comparison to other firms when we control for other factors affecting CEO incentives.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss the background for the changes in the SEC Compensation Disclosure Rules and 162(m). In section 3, we discuss our data collection procedure.
In section 4, we present our empirical results on the effects of the regulation on compensation structure, salary levels and growth rates, and compensation to performance sensitivity. In section 5, we spend time evaluating the effects of the regulations on the sharing rate and other measures of the sensitivity of CEO section 6.
wealth on changes in shareholder wealth. We examine the robustness of our results in section 6 and offer concluding comments in section 7.
2. The SEC's new Compensation Disclosure Rules and I.R.C. Section 162(m).
Background -Public outcry over the nature of executive pay-packages.
The attention of regulators and the investor public on the lack of a strong relation between executive compensation and firm performance increased in the early 1990s with the advent of The United Shareholder Association (USA) Compensation Surveys and pro-active institutional shareholders. With this background, executive compensation became a political issue. In 1991, legislation was proposed (but never enacted) which disallowed deductions for executive pay exceeding 25 times the lowest-paid worker and to give shareholders more rights to propose compensation-related policies. A visit to Japan by George
Bush and a group of highly paid U.S. executives further highlighted the apparent pay disparities between CEOs of U.S. and Japanese firms and CEO compensation became a presidential campaign issue in 1992.
The new SEC rules on Executive Compensation Disclosure
The new SEC Rules on Executive Compensation Disclosure were proposed in July 1992, became effective in October 1992, and were revised in August 1993 after an extensive review by the SEC of about 1,000 proxy statements. 6 These rules required that corporations enhance the disclosure of executive compensation in proxy statements beginning in January 1993. Some of the main features of these rules, effective with the 1993 proxy season, are that the reporting companies: (1) compare their financial performance to an industry benchmark with a table and performance graphs; (2) disclose in a tabular form the annual and long-term compensation for the CEO and the four most highly paid executives; (3) provide estimates of the present value of managerial stock options granted; and (4) provide a report by the compensation committee explicitly identifying quantitative or qualitative performance measures used to evaluate managers.
Various researchers have examined managerial reporting discretion relating to portions of these rules and their results suggest that managers and/or directors place great importance on compensation disclosure. Byrd, Johnson, and Porter (1998) and Lewellen, Park, and Ro (1996) report that managers choose industry-and peer-company stock return benchmarks that are downward biased. Thus, they argue that managers' benchmark choice tends to overstate the firm's performance. Murphy (1996) examines the limited discretion given managers in valuing stock options and finds that managers tend to select methodologies that reduce reported compensation. He concludes that managers bear non-pecuniary costs from high reported levels of compensation.
I.R.C. Section 162(m).
After his inauguration in 1993, President Clinton proposed and Congress adopted Section 162(m), a provision of the Internal Revenue Code that disallows deductions for non-performance related compensation over one million dollars for the CEO as well as the other four highest compensated officers of the corporation (i.e. all executives whose compensation must be reported in the proxy statement). 7 The applicable employee remuneration does not include remuneration payable on a commission basis, compensation that is performance-based, and compensation under a binding written contract in effect on February 13, 1993. 7 For the purpose of a deduction, compensation is classified as performance-based only if (i) the performance goals are determined by a compensation committee comprised solely of two or more outside directors, (ii) the performance goals under which the remuneration is to be paid are disclosed to the shareholders and approved by a majority vote, and (iii) before any payment of such remuneration, the compensation committee certifies that the performance goals and other material terms were satisfied.
As stated in our introduction, the intention of Congress in enacting 162(m) was not to raise substantial revenue for the government, but to shape corporate behavior. For example, a July 1993 projection of the Joint Committee on Taxation estimated total revenues generated from 162(m) over 1994-1998 to be only $335 million. In comparison, the simultaneous reduction of business meal deductions from 80% to 50% was expected to raise $15.4 billion over the same period. We gauge the potential direct economic impact of non-deductibility by estimating the potential loss of tax shield for each firm arising from cash compensation in excess of one million dollars. Specifically, we compute the salary and bonus in excess of one million dollars for each of the named executive officers of the firm reported on ExecuComp and multiply this excess compensation by the firm's estimated marginal tax rate and divide it by net income.
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For 1994-1997, the median potential loss of tax shield for firms with at least one executive officer (including the CEO) receiving cash compensation in excess of one million dollars is only 0.06% of net income. The mean is as high as 0.7% in 1994 and as low as 0.2% in 1997. Thus, for most firms, nondeductibility of excess compensation would not significantly affect net income.
9
Existing research on 162(m) already shows that 162(m) has affected the way firms approach compensation issues. Livingstone (1997) documents that many compensation committees are careful to maintain deductibility of executive pay under 162(m). Anderson and Bizjak (2000) We collect information on the performance measures used by compensation committees from the compensation committee reports in the proxy statements and retrieve accounting data from Compustat and stock returns from the CRSP files.
9 For a few firms, non-deductibility would make a difference. For example, the estimated potential loss in tax shield divided by net income for Green Tree Financial Corp. would have been 5% in 1994 Corp. would have been 5% in , 9% in 1995 Corp. would have been 5% in , and 17% in 1996 Annual compensation consists of salary, bonus, and "other annual compensation." "Other annual compensation" includes annual compensation not categorized as bonus or salary and includes perquisites and other personal benefits (unless such compensation is the lesser of either $50,000 or 10% of the total annual salary and bonus) and amounts reimbursed for the payment of taxes. The long-term component of compensation consists of restricted stock awards, options or stocks appreciation rights (SARs), and long-term incentive plan payouts (LTIP). The seventh component "all other comp ensation" consists of compensation that could not be properly reported in any other column of the Summary Compensation Over the sample period, all compensation components have increased dramatically even in real terms.
The median salary, the compensation component assumed to be least sensitive to performance, has increased by 17%. The bonus and long-term incentive plans and grants of restricted stock have all nearly doubled from 1992 to 1997. The present value of option grants has trebled in real terms over that period.
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Overall, the data in table 1 suggest a continuation, or even acceleration, of the rising compensation trend and rising use of stock options already documented by Hall and Liebman (1998) and Murphy (1999) .
Clearly, regulatory changes have not curbed overall CEO compensation levels.
While the data in table 1 provide a useful first glance at the evolution of CEO compensation and the effectiveness of the regulations, we need to keep in mind that not all firms are likely to be affected the same way by the regulations and that other variables also affect compensation levels. In the following sections, we separately examine firms most likely to be affected by the regulations and control for other factors likely to affect CEO compensation, such as firm performance.
Firms more likely to be affected by the regulations
While the SEC compensation disclosure requirements affect all firms, 162(m) does not 'directly' affect about one half of the firms in our sample, i.e. the firms with cash compensation lower than one million dollars. In the following subsections, we examine how the regulations have affected a subset of firms that are likely to be more sensitive to these regula tions. We first focus on CEO salaries because they are by definition not explicitly tied to performance and are subject to the 162(m) limitation. 
Increases versus decreases in salary: univariate statistics.
We know from To provide a first examination of this proposition, we categorize firms in six subsets based on salary in the prior year and examine what proportion of firms in each category increased, decreased, or did not change the CEO's salary and report these statistics in table 2.
14 In the categories below $900,000, between 75% and 84% of the salaries are increased post-1993. In contrast, in the categories above $1,000,000, only between 37% and 72% of salaries are raised in any one year post-1993. There is a general tendency for high salaries to be less likely to increase than lower salaries, especially for salaries between one million dollars and 1.1 million dollars. These univariate results suggest that in the subsets where firms are more likely to be affected by 162(m), the proportion of salary increases is significantly lower after 1993 than in the subsets with lower salaries. 15 This analysis is suggestive only and does not tell us whether we observe this tendency because of reversion to the mean or whether this tendency is related to the size and performance characteristics of the high salary firms. We investigate these aspects in the next few subsections.
Why do firms reduce million-dollar salaries?
Results in the preceding section show that a significant fraction of high salaries are reduced in any one year. To test whether these reductions result from regulations, we formulate Proposition 2B: Firms reduce salaries above one million dollars because of 162(m). To directly test this proposition, we identify 164 firms with salaries over $1 million at any time over 1992-1996. Of those 164 firms, 44 reduce the CEO salary to $1 million or below in the next year. We read the firms' proxy statements following the salary reduction to identify the reasons for this reduction. For 19 of the 44 firms, the salary is reduced following CEO turnover. We focus on the 25 remaining firms and put these in five categories provided in Our results so far suggest that firms with CEO earning salaries close to or over one million dollars are more likely to cut salaries than firms with lower CEO salaries and that when million-dollar salaries are cut, this often happens because of 162(m). While these results suggest that the regulations have an effect on the salary levels of some million-dollar firms, a majority of million-dollar firms still increase rather than reduce salaries. Further, of the 25 firms reducing salaries below one million dollars, only eight firms actually reduce total annual compensation to the CEO in that year. In fact, the median change in total CEO compensation for the 25 firms that reduce salaries is an increase of 28% the year that the salary is reduced. This finding reinforces our prior result that 162(m) did not reduce (the increases in) total compensation, even for firms that cut salaries as a result of 162(m). We examine this issue in more detail in section 4.3.
Salary growth rates: multivariate analysis
Our results in section 4.2.1. suggest that firms nearing the million-dollar range are less likely to increase the CEO's salary than firms with lower salaries. To have a better feel for the data, we first examine, but do not tabulate, CEO salary growth rates prior to 1994 and after 1993. Prior to 1994, the median salary growth rate for CEOs earning less than $900,000
is 5.8% compared to 4.6% for CEOs earning more than $900,000. After 1993, the growth rate for CEOs with lower salaries accelerates to 6.0%, whereas the median growth rate for CEOs with salaries above $900,000 declines to 2.7%. The acceleration in growth rates for lower-paid CEOs and the decline in growth rates for higher-paid CEOs are both statistically different from zero. The salary growth rates for the two subgroups are also significantly different from one another after 1993. This result suggests, again, that salary growth rates are lower for CEOs with salaries close to or beyond the million-dollar benchmark. In the sections below, we examine this issue more formally by including control variables known to have an effect on CEO compensation levels.
Control variables likely to affect salary levels --and other compensation components
Firm performance is likely to affect salary levels through time. Prior researchers, such as Murphy (1985), Lambert and Larcker (1987) , Ely (1991), and Sloan (1993) , have used stock returns, accounting returns, and sales as performance variables. 16 We take a slightly different approach to identify relevant 16 Stock returns are an obvious performance measure because shareholders care about stock returns. Lambert and Larcker (1987) , Ely (1991) , and Sloan (1993) explain the usefulness of accounting-based profitability measures by demonstrating how they validate the inclusion of accounting performance measures to shield executives from fluctuations in stock returns that are beyond the manager's control. The use of accounting measures is particularly appropriate, they argue, for firms or industries where stock prices provide a noisy measure of executive performance. In another vein, Paul (1992) shows that, in an efficient market, accounting earnings will be superfluous in determining firm value but will still be useful in determining the value added by the individual managing the assets. Sales growth can be seen as a performance variable, which we find for several firms, or it can be seen as a measure for firm size. Smith and Watts (1992) and Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) , among others, highlight the importance of firm size in performance variables. 17 We select a random sample of 100 S&P 500 and 100 Midcap 400 firms, identify the performance measures used by the compensation committee to determine CEO compensation, and provide descriptive statistics on the use of various types of performance measures in determining executive compensation. They argue that executives of large firms should be paid more because they can create more value or because they manage more complex organizations. 17 This approach, now possible with the improved compensation disclosure, offers additional insights into the pay and performance relation. 18 We also document that 69% of the firms use non-financial measures. Based on our classification, about 31% of the compensation committees incorporate individual business objectives, 22% of the committees incorporate the achievement of s trategic targets, 16% incorporate the leadership role of the CEO, 18% incorporate customer satisfaction, and 12% incorporate human resources objectives in their evaluation of the CEO's performance. Firms also use a wide variety of other measures that are difficult to include in one of the above categories. The types of measures used across S&P 500 and Midcap 400 firms are comparable, although Midcap firms use more non-financial measures than S&P 500 firms. Ittner, Larcker, and Rajan (1997) document that the use of non-financial measures increases with EPS is a net income measure that is not as correlated with firm size as basic net income. To facilitate comparison with prior studies, we scale EPS by the previous period's stock price. We select sales because it is still used frequently in bonus programs, and because so many prior studies document its strong relation with salary levels. We use stock returns because it is another commonly used performance measure that is not as correlated with sales and EPS and because shareholder activists tend to promote it.
We also need to discuss the timing of the performance variables. Salaries are negotiated before the year's results are known, so the prior year's performance is likely to affect this year's salary. The situation is different for the bonus, where this year's performance typically affects this year's bonus. 19 To make sure we include the relevant performance variables, we include both lagged and contemporaneous performance in all our models.
We also include CEO tenure, because Murphy (1986) , among others, demonstrates that tenure affects the structure of compensation contracts. Because firm size has an important effect on compensation levels, compensation structure, governance structure, and performance, we use the total assets of the firm to control for firm size. Other firm specific and industry specific variables may also affect compensation, but we control for their likely influence on compensation levels by controlling for firm effects in our analysis of the sensitivity of bonus payments and total compensation to performance.
Multivariate model
To examine changes in salary, we estimate the following regression model:
the level of regulation and with the extent firms follow an innovation-oriented strategy, and decreases with higher correlations between accounting and market returns. 19 The timing of when a company reports bonuses can vary depending on which fiscal year the bonus is actually received by the CEO. If an annual bonus is paid subsequent to the close of the fiscal year, the bonus may be reported in the following year's compensation, resulting in a lag similar to the one with salaries. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 The model's independent variables are:
∆Ln (Salary it ) = α 1 ln(CEO tenure it) + α 2 ln(assets it) + α
ln(CEO tenure it) = the natural logarithm of the number of years the current CEO of firm i has held the position of CEO in year t ln(assets it) = natural logarithm of firm i's contemporaneous assets ∆EPS it, ∆EPS it-1 = the change in the earnings per share, excluding extraordinary items and discontinued operations, for years t and t-1 for firm i, scaled by the previous period's year-end stock price ∆Ln(Sales it ), ∆Ln(Sales it-1 ) = the change in the logarithm of sales for years t and t-1 for firm i
Holding period return it Holding period return it-1 = holding period returns for years t and t-1 for firm i
Post-93 dummy = a dummy variable equal to one for compensation in 1994, 1995, 1996 or 1997 and equal to zero for 1992 and 1993 $MM firm variable = (1) a semi-continuous variable equal to one if firm i's CEO's salary was equal to or greater than one million dollars in year t-1 and equal to the CEO's salary divided by one million dollars if the CEO's salary was less than one million dollars (see Hall and Liebman (1999) ) or (2) a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO earned a salary of more than $900,000 in the preceding year or (3) a dummy variable equal to one for firms with CEOs earning annual cash compensation of more than one million dollars at least once over the 1992-1997 period.
Results
We report the results of our analysis on changes in salary in table 5. We present quantile regression results with bootstrapped standard errors (bsqreg in STATA). In model (i), we use the semi-continuous million-dollar variable definition, in model (ii) we use a dummy variable equal to one for CEOs with salaries higher than $900,000 in the preceding year as the million dollar variable, and in model (iii) we use a dummy equal to one if the CEO earned more than one million dollars in salary and bonus at least once over the sample period as the million-dollar variable. We also estimate the results using other regression methods but these analyses yield similar results and we do not report these results for brevity. An important distinction between the definition of million dollar firms in the first two models and the third model is that the value of the third variable does not change for a firm over the sample period, whereas the value of the first two variables can change over time.
Overall, we find that longer tenures are associated with smaller increases in salary and in the first model, size is positively related to changes in sala ry. Additionally, in all models we find that contemporaneous earnings and returns are unrelated to changes in salary, whereas contemporaneous and lagged sales as well as lagged earnings (in the second two models) and returns have a positive effect on changes in salary. The importance of lagged performance measures over contemporaneous performance measures is expected given the way salaries are set, i.e. before the contemporaneous year's performance is known. We find that changes in salary are negatively related with closeness to a million-dollar salary in model (i) but unrelated with the million-dollar status in the other two models. When the million-dollar variable is interacted with the post-1993 dummy, we find a significant and negative coefficient in models (i) and (ii) and an insignificant negative relation in model (iii). This result suggests that after 1993 increases in salary are smaller, ceteris paribus, for CEOs with salaries of one million dollars or close to one million dollars. When the million-dollar variable is much broader and includes CEOs earning more than one million dollars in salary and bonus at least once, the changes in salary also appear to be lower, but the relation is not significant [model (iii)].
4.3.The structure of compensation contracts and the substitution effect
The evidence thus far indicates that some million-dollar firms have responded to the regulations by reducing salaries, but without reducing total compensation as suggested by our previous discussion. This result suggests that there has been a change in the structure of compensation contracts, with a decrease in the importance of salary. Although the objective of Congress in enacting 162(m) was to reduce excessive compensation, shareholder activists were mostly concerned with enhancing the relation between pay and performance. Hence, the increasing importance of performance sensitive compensation components is also consistent with firms responding to shareholder activism pressures. proposition 3 is provided in table 1 where one can see that salaries increase at a slower pace than other compensation components. We also make a univariate comparison of compensation structure of firms with CEOs earning more or less than $900,000 and of CEOs with high and low managerial ownership.
The regulatory effect should be important for firms with CEOs earning more than $900,000 and firms with low managerial ownership, because these firms are more subject to shareholder pressures to comply with 162(m) and strengthen the pay for performance relation. 20 The trends we observe -but do not tabulate for brevity -are consistent with Proposition 3. They suggest that ex-post payments based on performance sensitive components of compensation have become more important over time. At least two major caveats of this comparison exist. First, it is possible that a substitution occurred and the non-salary portion of compensation was increasing because salary increases were constrained by 162(m). This substitution is consistent with economic theory suggesting that a risk averse agent will require a higher level of compensation if the compensation has become riskier (i.e. performance-based rather than a fixed salary). Alternatively, compensation may appear to be more sensitive to firm performance because the bonus payments are larger due to the improved economic performance after 1993.
We address this first limitation by estimating a model similar to the models in table 5, but which includes the change in the value of stock-based compensation plus bonus for the corresponding and the previous year. We do not find a statistically significant relation between changes in salary and the changes in the sum of the annual bonus payments and grants of stock-based compensation and variations of this measure suggesting that our model is not able to capture this substitution effect.
Measuring the pay for performance sensitivity
Although we report an increase in the importance of performance-dependent components of compensation, we have not analyzed whether the annual pay to performance sensitivity has increased. This is, however, a key component of the expectations of shareholder activists with respect to the way CEOs are compensated. We formulate Proposition 4: Increased shareholder scrutiny through enhanced disclosure and 162(m) will lead to an increase in the sensitivity of pay to performance after 1993, especially for firms subject to 162(m) . To test this proposition, we examine the relation between CEO bonus and total CEO compensation and various measures of firm performance, and examine whether this relation is different for firms subject to the regulations, especially for the milliondollar firms identified by our three different million-dollar variables.
The model
Various models have been used to examine the sensitivity of annual compensation flows to firm performance. Murphy (1985) argues that it is important to control for CEO-specific variables that are constant over time but that vary across firms and solves this problem by including CEO dummies. Murphy (1986) reports that the use of first differences instead of compensation levels implicitly controls for these fixed effects. Joskow, Rose, and Shepard (1993) , Hubbard and Palia (1995) , and Joskow, Rose, and Wolfram (1996) , among others, argue that a fixed effects model is better specified for their panel data.
This also seems to be the case for our data, hence we report results using a firm-fixed effects model. We also estimate all the models using (1) first differences of the logarithms of compensation in the spirit of Murphy (1985) and Sloan (1993) and our models in (1) or interactions thereof. We include interaction variables between the three performance measures, the post-1993 dummy variable, and the three million-dollar firm variables to gauge whether the sensitivity of compensation to performance increases after 1993, especially for million-dollar firms. The year t dummy variables are equal to one for compensation in year t and equal to zero all other years. Note that in models (v) and (vi), we do not include the million-dollar variable by 21 In our models, bonus is a linear function of performance. Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan (1995) use non-public survey data from a consulting firm and document that many bonus plans are fixed-target plans, in which executives do not receive any payoff until they reach a lower bound of the performance measure. Between the lower and the higher bound, the bonus increases linearly with the performance measure. Beyond the higher bound and the itself or its interaction with the post-1993 dummy. Under this definition of million-dollar firms, the firm either has a dummy value of one or zero for the whole sample period. Because it is constant for each firm during the entire sample period, it cannot be included in a firm fixed effects model.
The results
We present our results in table 6. The dependent variable for models (i), (iii), and (v) is the logarithm of bonus and for models (ii), (iv), and (vi) the dependent variable is the logarithm of total compensation.
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In all models, we find that CEO tenure is not related to bonus payments and total compensation. We find,
however, that even after controlling for contemporaneous and lagged performance, including sales, firm size measured by total assets is positively related to total compensation but not related to bonus payouts.
Focusing on the first six performance coefficients, we find as expected that the bonus payments are positively related to all three contemporaneous performance measures and also to lagged returns. Total compensation is only positively related to contemporaneous profitability.
Next, we examine the relation with performance measures post-1993. The first four coefficients examine the sensitivity of bonus and total pay to profitability or deflated earnings per share. The next four coefficients examine the sensitivity of bonus and total pay to sales growth. There is a decline in the relation between bonus payouts as well as total compensation and profitability post-1993, but this decline in maximum bonus, additional performance is not reflected in the bonus. These features can reduce the explanatory power of our model. 22 We do not report coefficients on firm dummies, but the R-square we report is the absolute R-square. 23 Using the natural logarithm of bonus leads to computational complications because a non-insignificant fraction of bonuses are equal to zero. These fractions are quite similar for bonuses over the sample period, around 19%. When the bonus grant is equal to zero, we assign a discretionary value of 1 to those payments, so that the logarithm is zero. If we assign other values, such as 0.001 or 1,000 instead of 1, the magnitude of the coefficients changes significantly and the signs of the coefficients on tenure and ln (sales) are reversed between the choice of 0.001 and 1 and the choice of 1,000. Additionally, the explanatory power of the model is larger when we use 1,000 instead of 0.001 and 1 for bonuses with values equal to zero. 24 There are fewer observations in models (i) to (iv) because the million-dollar variable definition requires knowledge of the cash compensation in the preceding year. As a result we lose some 1991 or 1992 observations. sensitivity for bonus payouts does not exist or is less pronounced for million-dollar firms. The sensitivity with lagged earnings is less clear. In model (i) there is an increasing positive relation with lagged earnings, but less so as firms approach the million-dollar status. Bonus payouts are less sensitive to contemporaneous sales growth post-1993 across all of the million-dollar definitions, and there is also an increase in the sensitivity to lagged sales for total compensation in model (vi).
The most important performance measure to shareholders is stock returns and the changes in sensitivity post-1993 are much clearer with respect to the sensitivity to stock returns. Specifically, there is an increase in the sensitivity to contemporaneous stock returns post-1993 for both bonus payouts and total compensation (significant in five of six models) and this increase is even more pronounced as firms approach the million-dollar status (significant in four of six models). For lagged stock returns, there is also an increase in the sensitivity after 1993, especially for million-dollar firms (significant in four of the six models). This relation does not exist in models (iii) and (iv) where the million-dollar variable is only one for CEOs earning more than $900,000 of salary. It is possible that this definition is not broad enough to identify all the firms that are concerned about 162(m), or that the lack of significant relation is due to the smaller sample of firms defined as million dollar firms with this definition.
The negative coefficient on the million-dollar variable in the bonus models suggests that bonus payouts have been lower for million-dollar firms even when other factors, such as the sensitivity to performance, are taken into account. The positive coefficients on the million-dollar and post-1993 indicator variable suggest marginally higher total compensation payouts for million-dollar firms. Together with the lower salary increases for million-dollar firms post-1993, this result suggests that there has been some substitution from salary to other compensation components for million-dollar firms. These coefficients are not, however, significant at conventional levels of statistical significance. Finally, the year dummies suggest an increase in bonus in all years.
One strong conclusion of our analysis of the sensitivity of CEO bonus and total compensation to performance is that there is a stronger relation between bonus payments and/or total pay and stock returns post-1993, and that this relation is significantly more pronounced as firms approach the million-dollar status (in models (i) and (ii) or for million-dollar firms (especially models (iv), (v), and (vi)). In addition, this relation holds for both contemporaneous and lagged returns. The existing relation with lagged returns is understandable given the timing when some firms determine the bonus payouts and total pay. Our results are consistent with the notion that the regulations have had an impact on the pay for performance relation in that the sensitivity of bonus and total compensation to stock returns has increased post-1993, especially for firms that are more likely to be affected by the regulations. Murphy (1999) and Hall (1999) document that there is a mechanical relation between option grants (included in the total compensation measure) and rising stock markets because 40% of the companies grant options on a "fixed share" basis. Granting a fixed number of shares annually will mean that rising stock values will mechanically lead to stock option grants with higher values. We do not believe that this mechanical relation explains our findings because we find a strong increased sensitivity between bonus cash payouts (which do not include option payouts) and stock returns in models (i), (iii), and (v).
Measures of changes in CEO wealth for changes in shareholder wealth
Thus far, we have focused on the sensitivity of annual compensation flows (i.e. salary, bonus, restricted stock, stock options, long-term incentive plan payouts, and other compensation) to firm performance. We have taken this approach because compensation critics have concentrated on these annual flows and because this is the flow that was apparently targeted by the regulations. Jensen and Murphy (1990) , Hall and Liebman (1998) , Murphy (1999) , among others, show that CEO equity and option ownership in the firm accounts for the bulk of the sensitivity of CEO wealth to firm performance. While our prior results indicate that compensation structure and the compensation to performance sensitivity of million-dollar firms have been affected by the regulations, a crucial question to determine the economic impact of the regulations, is whether these compensation effects translate into a higher sensitivity of CEO wealth to shareholder wealth. To examine this issue, we formulate Proposition 5: After the regulations, the change in CEO wealth per dollar change in shareholder wealth increases, especially for million-dollar firms.
To study the evolution of CEO ownership incentives, we first examine the bottom two rows of table 1, in which we report the percentage of CEO stock and option ownership for our sample firms. Both means and medians suggest that CEO stock ownership has been relatively stable or even declined during the sample period. In contrast, the mean (median) stock option ownership increases from 1.0% (0.4%) in 1992 to 1.1% (0.7%) in 1997. This result is consistent with Ofek and Yermack (2000) who find that executives often divest shares following the exercise of stock options.
To further investigate proposition 5, we use an approach similar to Hall and Liebman (1998) and present three measures of the relation between CEO wealth changes and shareholder wealth changes.
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The first measure, the percent change in compensation, is defined as the change in the CEO's wealth 26 for a typical change in firm performance, which we define as an increase from the 50 th percentile of stock 25 For tables 7 and 8, we only use those firms that have complete information for both 1993 and 1996. 26 We estimate CEO wealth using a methodology that combines Murphy (1999) and Hall and Liebman (1998) . For each CEO, we calculate an implied "compensation" for a given level of performance in the following manner. First, we estimate the implied salary and bonus for each firm by estimating an implicit cash compensation-for-performance elasticity for each year and for each subgroup using a quantiles regression model ∆ln(salary +bonus)=ln(1+return). This year and subgroup (defined by million-dollar variable) elasticity is then converted into a firm-specific implied salary and bonus by multiplying by the return at a given performance level and the CEO's salary and bonus for the prior year ((1+elasticity)*return*(salary+bonus)) (See Murphy 1999). The implicit elasticities are similar to those calculated by Murphy (1999) and Hall and Liebman (1998) and range from 0.26 to 0.52. Second, we compute the change in the value of the CEO's option portfolio using a delta of 0.6. Third, we estimate the change in the value of the common stock and restricted stock portfolio held by each CEO. Finally, we add the value of the median level of restricted stock grants, option grants and other annual compensation for the entire sample of firms, which translates into holding constant each of these components across all firms. One major difference in our calculation of each returns to the 70 th percentile (following Hall and Liebman (1998) Murphy (1999) , among others, is also evident in the results in table 7. The Jensen-Murphy statistic is significantly lower for million-dollar firms, which is expected because CEOs with higher salaries tend to be from larger firms and large-firm CEOs tend to CEO's compensation compared to Hall and Liebman (1998) is that the salary and bonus payments are not held constant across firms. 27 We use the distribution of stock returns for all of the ExecuComp firms in our sample in a given year. For 1993, the stock return at the 50 th percentile was 15.8% and at the 70 th percentile was 33.8% (a difference of 18.0 percentage points). For 1996, the median stock return was 16.3% and the return at the 70 th percentile was 32.6% (a difference of 16.3 percentage points). We use 1996 as our post-regulation comparison year because of the similar distribution of returns. 28 We estimate the Jensen-Murphy sharing rate as the sum of (1) the common and restricted stock sensitivity, which is the fractional ownership of common and restricted stock, (2) the options sensitivity, which is the number of options held multiplied by an implied delta of 0.6 and divided by the number of shares outstanding, and (3) the implicit cash compensation sensitivity, calculated as the cash compensation elasticity described in Footnote 26 multiplied by the CEO's salary and bonus and divided by the market value of the firm. have lower fractional ownership stakes. Overall, we do not find any clear trend in the univariate analysis of these sensitivity measures.
To further examine the evolution of these wealth-to-performance measures, we estimate the following model:
Change in the wealth-to-performance sensitivity measure from 1993 to 1996 for each firm = α 0 + α 1 ln (CEO tenure) 93 + α 2 ln(assets) 93 + α 3 CEO turnover + α 4 ln(CEO dollar ownership) 93 + α 5 Million-dollar variable + ε
We expect that longer CEO tenures will increase the wealth for performance sensitivities if CEOs accumulate larger ownership stakes in the firm. Firm size, measured by the logarithm of total assets, may be a potential determinant of wealth-to-performance sensitivity to the extent it is related to many corporate governance variables, including ownership. Specifically, as larger firms are more likely to be the target of shareholder activism, we expect the wealth-to-performance sensitivity level to be lower but to increase more for larger firms. We expect that CEO turnover will reduce the wealth-to-performance sensitivity, because new CEOs are likely to have lower levels of ownership of both stock and options than exiting
CEOs. Finally, we expect that CEO ownership will be positively related to the level of wealth-toperformance sensitivity, but negatively related to changes in these sensitivities. Specifically, when CEOs already have large equity stakes in the firm, there will be less pressure on the firm to increase CEO incentives. We report results with CEO ownership as the logarithm of the dollar value of the CEO's ownership. This variable is suggestive of how much the CEO has at stake (relative to her/his unknown total portfolio). We also estimate the models with CEO ownership as a percentage of total firm ownership. The results are qualitatively unchanged with this measure of CEO ownership.
Our results are reported in table 8. In models (i) to (iii), the dependent variable is the change in the percentage change from 1993 to 1996. In models (iv) to (vi), the dependent variable is the change in the Hall and Liebman elasticity. Finally, in models (vii) to (ix), the dependent variable is the change in the Jensen-Murphy statistic. For each series of three models, we use the three million-dollar proxy variables we have also used in our previous regressions.
In all but two of the models, the constant is positive and significant suggesting that there has been an increase in the CEO wealth-to-performance sensitivity. We also find that CEO tenure does not affect the change in CEO wealth-to-performance sensitivity from 1993 to 1996. Size, however, seems to have a positive impact on the increase in the sensitivity of wealth to performance from 1993 to 1996. This is consistent with the notion that large firms are more likely to be pressured to increase CEO incentives. As expected, we also find that CEO turnover leads to a decline in the CEO's wealth-to-performance sensitivity over the corresponding period. This result suggests that new CEOs do not immediately have wealth-to-performance sensitivities that are close to the outgoing CEO's sensitivity. This relation is not significant, however, in the last three regressions in which the dependent variable is the Jensen-Murphy statistic. Also as expected, we find that higher levels of CEO ownership in 1993 result in smaller changes in sensitivity from 1993 to 1996. This result is consistent with our argument that firms with high CEO ownership have less pressure to increase CEO incentives by further aligning CEO and shareholder wealth.
The most important results for our analysis are the coefficients and significance levels of the milliondollar variables. For all but one (model ix) of the nine models, we find a significant positive relation between the million-dollar variable and the change in sensitivity. This result indicates that controlling for other potentially important factors, the sensitivity of CEO wealth to firm performance has increased significantly for firms that are more likely to be subject to 162(m) in comparison to other firms. Overall, these results are consistent with our prior results on annual compensation flows.
Additional tests and robustness checks

Ownership or shareholder targeting?
We perform various tests to examine whether our results are sensitive to measurement method or sample selection. Thus far we have focused on the subset of million-dollar firms because they are more likely to be affected by the regulations. We now examine whether the million-dollar effect is due to the fact that million dollar firms are large firms with common governance characteristics that make them more sensitive to shareholder pressures relating to compensation. Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) , among others, document that governance structure affects CEO compensation. We explore the characteristic s of million-dollar firms using an untabulated logistic model and confirm that million-dollar firms tend to be large firms with low CEO ownership. Firms with low CEO ownership are firms where the CEO has less control or where the board is more likely to face investor pressures to increase the alignment between CEO and shareholder incentives.
Next, we estimate the models from table 6 and add interaction variables for (i) firms with low CEO ownership (a dummy equal to one if the CEO's ownership is lower than the median CEO ownership for 1993 and equal to zero otherwise), and (ii) firms that have been targeted by shareholder activists [we use various targeting definitions with data from Strickland, Wiles, and Zenner (1996) and Wahal (1996) ]. We find that the sensitivity to stock returns increases both for low ownership firms and for both definitions of million dollar firms after 1993 compared to firms with high ownership or firms that are not million dollar firms with high ownership. A similar yet weaker pattern is also observable for the sensitivity to EPS.
Overall, these results suggest that sensitivities to performance measures increased after 1993 both for million-dollar and low ownership firms. This result is consistent with the notion that 162(m) affected the pay for performance sensitivity and that boards of firms with low CEO ownership increased the pay for performance sensitivity of compensation contracts to align CEO and shareholder interests. We do not find such a result for interactions with the targeting dummy. Overall, our results show that although the governance variables matter, they do not affect our prior results, namely that million-dollar firms have increased the sensitivity of compensation to performance beyond what other firms have done following the enactment of 162(m). These results are not tabulated for brevity.
Firms that do not pay taxes?
If 162(m) has an effect on the pay for performance sensitivity, then non-tax-paying firms should be less sensitive to its influence. To examine this assumption, we identify 310 firm-years, representing 169 different firms, with zero tax rates according to Graham's (1996) trichotomous tax rate approximations.
We repeat the tests presented in table 6 using dummies and interactions for the tax paying status. We do not find an effect of the tax paying status for bonus payments sensitivity, but for total compensation we find a stronger sensitivity to stock returns after 1993 for million-dollar tax paying firms. This result is consistent with the notion that tax-paying firms should be more sensitive to 162(m) than non-tax-paying firms.
Regulated firms
Crawford, Ezzell, and Miles (1995), Shepard (1993), Joskow, Rose, and Wolfram (1996) , and Kole and Lehn (1999) , among others, show that compensation policies of regulated utilities and financial institutions are quite different from the compensation policies in non-regulated industries. If banking and utilities regulators already monitor CEO compensation in those industries, then one would expect that the regulatory effects we examine would be less important for the regulated industries. We examine whether our results change when we do not include the banks, insurance companies, and utilities in our tests. We find that our results are qualitatively similar without those industries.
Variations in the measure of the firms likely to be affected by 162(m)
We present all our results with three very different proxies designed to capture how sensitive firms would be to the impact of 162(m). Our results are similar in nature for all three definitions (although the significance of the coefficients differs). Specifically, in table 5 we document lower increases in salary, ceteris paribus, for million-dollar firms, and in table 6 we document that there is an increase in the sensitivity of bonus payouts and total compensation to stock returns for million-dollar firms post-1993.
Finally, in table 8 we show that for million-dollar firms there is an increase in the sensitivity of CEO wealth to performance post-1993 after controlling for other factors that affect CEO incentives.
We also use several other million-dollar definitions. For instance, for one definition we only include firms with CEOs who have a salary that is higher than one million dollars. This change in the definition does not change the qualitative nature of our results. We also broaden the million-dollar dummy definition to include firms in which the CEO has earned at least $800,000 or $750,000 in salary and find that our results on the million-dollar dummy are weakened and eventually disappear, as we would expect. The further away a firm is from a million-dollar salary, the less sensitive it will be to 162(m).
Poor performers only
Corporate performance has been excellent over the sample period. Is the positive relation between stock returns and compensation due to this positive performance? To examine this issue, we estimate the models in table 6 for poor performers only. We define poor performers as firms with at least two years of negative stock returns over the sample period, or more restrictively with two years of negative stock returns after 1993. Although the coefficients and significance of our results differ from table 6, we still find an increase in the sensitivity of bonus to stock returns for all firms, and especially for million-dollar firms after 1993, suggesting that the table 6 results also apply to poorly performing firms.
Concluding comments
The objectives of the new SEC Compensation Disclosure Rules and Section 162(m) were to reduce excessive CEO compensation levels and strengthen the pay for performance relation. We formulate five
propositions to test the effect of these compensation regulations using 1991-1997 CEO compensation data.
We find that the regulations have not achieved the objective of reducing CEO compensation growth. Yet, the regulations appear to have had some effects on the compensation structure of million-dollar firms.
First, 23 of the 25 firms reducing CEO salaries greater than one million dollars to one million dollars or below refer to 162(m) in doing so. However, for most of these firms, total compensation still increases.
Second, there is an increase in the positive effect of contemporaneous and lagged stock returns on bonus payments and total compensation after 1993, especially for million-dollar firms. Robustness tests show that the increased sensitivity is not driven by surging stock option grants, the definition of million-dollar firms, or CEO ownership. Third, we use three measures of the sensitivity of the CEO's wealth to firm value and our three measures of a firm's million-dollar status to examine changes in CEO wealth to performance sensitivity. Relative to other firms, we document an increase in the CEO wealth to shareholder value sensitivity from 1993 to 1996 for million-dollar firms after controlling for other factors that affect CEO incentives. In sum, our results suggest that compensation committees have taken the regulatory environment into account, and that these regulations have had a real economic impact on compensation levels. Re-engineering, quality of earnings, longevity, quality of research or marketing, gas costs, life quality in service area, building shareholder value Table 5  Changes in salary before and after the regulations   This table contains the results of quantile (medians) regression analyses to examine differences in changes in salary between CEOs from firms subject to Section 162(m) and CEOs from firms less likely to be affected by Section 162(m). Assets, sales, and compensation have been transformed into logarithms. CEO tenure is the number of years the CEO has held the CEO title. Holding period returns are raw holding period returns. Earnings per share (EPS) exclude extraordinary items and discontinued operations and are deflated by the prior year's stock price. In the first model, the million-dollar variable is equal to one if the CEO's salary in the prior year is greater than or equal to one million dollars and is equal to the CEO's salary in the prior year divided by one million for salaries less than one million dollars. In the next model, the million-dollar variable is a dummy equal to one if the CEO earned more than $900,000 in salary in the preceding year. The $900,000 benchmark is selected because firms paying CEOs in that range are or are close to being subject to 162(m) based on salary alone. In the third model, the million-dollar variable is a dummy that is equal to one if the firm's CEO at any one time during the sample period earned more than one million dollars in salary and bonus. We control for CEO tenure, firm size, and contemporaneous and lagged firm performance. Year-dummies are equal to one if the observation is for the said year and equal to zero otherwise. Regression p-values are in parentheses.
Dependent variable is ∆ Ln(Salary) Explanatory variables We use time series data for firms of the S&P 500, Midcap, and Smallcap index over 1991-1997. Assets, sales, and compensation have been transformed into logarithms. CEO tenure is the number of years the CEO has held the CEO title. Holding period returns are raw holding period returns. Earnings per share (EPS) exclude extraordinary items and discontinued operations and are deflated by the prior year's stock price. In the first model, the million-dollar variable is equal to one if the CEO's salary in the prior year is greater than or equal to one million dollars and is equal to the CEO's salary in the prior year divided by one million for salaries less than one million dollars. In the next model, the million-dollar variable is a dummy equal to one if the CEO earned more than $900,000 in salary in the preceding year. The $900,000 benchmark is selected because firms paying CEOs in that range are or are close to being subject to 162(m) based on salary alone. In the last two models, the million-dollar variable is a dummy that is equal to one if the firm's CEO at any one time during the sample period earned more than one million dollars in salary and bonus. For each pair of models, the first model analyzes the CEO bonus, the second model focuses on total CEO compensation, and the compensation data are in CPI-deflated 1992 constant dollars. Year-dummies are equal to one if the observation is for the said year and equal to zero otherwise. Regression p-values are in parentheses. For models (ii), (iv), and (vi) the sample consists of a smaller set of firms for which option values are available. In this table we compare three measures of the sensitivity of changes in CEO wealth to changes in shareholder wealth. The three measures are: (i) the "percent change" in compensation, defined as the change in the CEO's wealth for a typical change in firm performance, which we define as an increase from the 50 th percentile of stock returns to the 70 th percentile (following Hall and Liebman (1998) ), (ii) the "elasticity", defined as the percent change in compensation calculated above divided by the percent change in market value or difference in total shareholder return from the 50 th to the 70 th percentile in that year, and (iii) the "Jensen--Murphy (JM) statistic" defined as the dollar change in compensation for a $1,000 change in market value. We compare these three measures for firms that are classified as million dollar firms using two of the million-dollar variables as defined previously. We do not use the semi-continuous million-dollar variable because it is not an indicator variable. % point ∆ in the ∆ from 50 to 70 ∆ in the elasticity from 50 to 70 ∆ in the Jensen-Murphy Statistic 1993 1993 1993 Salary in 1993 < $900,000 (n=820) results of regression with robust standard errors on three measures of the sensitivity of the change in the CEO's wealth to changes in firm performance The three empirical proxies are defined in the heading to table 7. The change is the increase for each firm in the measure of CEO wealth to performance from 1993 to 1996. The control variables are the logarithm of CEO tenure, where CEO tenure is the number of years the CEO has held the CEO title; the logarithm of the firm's assets; a dummy equal to one if there was a change in the CEO during that period; and the percentage or the logarithm of the CEO's ownership. The key test variable is designed to identify firms that are more likely to be subject to 162(m). We use the same three million-dollar variables that are in tables 5 and 6. These variables are explained in detail in the heading to table 5. Regression p-values are in parentheses and are calculated using White-corrected standard errors.
Dependent variable is Explanatory variables
Change in the elasticity from 50 to 70 % point change in the change from 50 to 70 Change in the Jensen-Murphy Statistic Model (i) Model ( 
